emphasizing the protection of individual rights over the more ambitious aim of achieving the human good. Indeed, both tend to be uneasy with talk of an ultimate good, advising tolerance of diverging conceptions of the ultimate purpose of life. Both traditions have a tendency to focus on the individual rather than the collectivity in their moral philosophies and their social theories alike. Thus, there are good reasons for supposing that those who regard the development of liberalism and the spread of Enlightenment as "aspects of one and the same current of thought and practice" (Gray 1986, 16) are not entirely misguided.
The identification of liberalism and the Enlightenment is not, however, quite as straightforward as it first appears. While it may be the case that leading figures of the English Enlightenment (assuming, for the purposes of argument, that we can speak of such a thing as an English Enlightenment) 2 also played a major role in the history of the development of liberalism, it is not at all clear that this relationship holds everywhere 1
For an overview of some of the received wisdom on this point, see Garrard 1997, 281-82 . For an account of Enlightenment natural law theory attentive to the ways in which these generalizations do not hold up, see Haakonssen 1996 2 For an argument that there was one, see Porter 1981.
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else. Eighteenth-century Prussia offers one counterexample worth examining. During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, a wide-ranging debate on the nature and limits of enlightenment raged in the pages of scholarly and popular journals (see Schmidt 1996) .
One particularly fierce sideline of this more general controversy was the dispute between
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn over Jacobi's claim that
Mendelssohn's friend Gotthold Ephraim Lessing had, shortly before his death, revealed to Jacobi that he was a "Spinozist." In the debate that followed -which came to be known, somewhat misleadingly, as the "Pantheism Dispute" -Mendelssohn defended the Enlightenment against Jacobi's criticisms. 3 Yet Mendelssohn, even when he was advocating such traditional liberal values as religious toleration, argued in ways that are difficult to square with our understanding of liberalism, while much in the views of Jacobi, the critic of the Enlightenment, is conventionally liberal.
In what follows I will first discuss Mendelssohn's defense of the idea of enlightenment and his arguments in favor of religious toleration. I will then examine Jacobi's critique of the Enlightenment in both its philosophical and its political dimensions. I will conclude with a suggestion about the tension between rationalist and critical strains within the Enlightenment and its significance for the relationship between liberalism and the Enlightenment.
Mendelssohn's Defense of Enlightenment and Religious Liberty
In December 1783 the Berlinische Monatsschrift published an article by the theologian and educational reformer Johann Friedrich Zöllner that, in a footnote, posed the question "What is enlightenment?" (Hinske and Albrecht 1990, 115 For general discussions of the Pantheism Dispute, see Beiser 1987 , 44-126, Beck 1969 , 352-74, and Scholz 1916 Liberalism and Enlightenment in Eighteenth -Century Germany 3 moral weeklies. While Immanuel Kant's answer to the question in the December 1784
issue of the Berlinische Monatsschrift is by far the most famous, it was not the first response to the question published by that journal. As Kant (1996, 64) noted in the closing footnote of his essay, three months earlier the journal had published an article on Zöllner's question by the great German-Jewish man of letters Moses Mendelssohn.
The question that appeared in the Berlinische Monatsschrift had been under discussion for several months in the Berlin Wednesday Society, a secret society of For a discussion of the Oberkonsistorium and its responsibilities see Birtsch 1990. 8 For a contrast between the situation faced by French philosophes and the German Aufklärer see Hampson 1981, 45 and Whaley 1981, 117 . Also, see the discussion in La Vopa 1990, 35-37.
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Mendelssohn's article in response to Zöllner's question represented an attempt to pull together the various strains of the discussion of enlightenment that predated the appearance of Zöllner's article in the Berlinische Monatsschrift . 9 In formulating his summary, Mendelssohn focused on the relationship of the term "enlightenment" to two other related concepts: "culture" [Kultur] , and "education" [Bildung] . All three terms, he argued, denoted "modifications of social life, the consequences of the industry and the efforts of men to better their social conditions" (Mendelssohn 1996, 53) . The most fundamental of the three terms was Bildung -a term which defies easy translation and can be rendered as "culture," "education," "formation," or "development." In the demarcation Mendelssohn proposed in his response to Zöllner, Aufklärung refers to the "theoretical" side of the process of Bildung and involves a "rational reflection on the things of human life." Kultur, in contrast, is concerned with "practical" matters, with
"goodness, refinement, and beauty in handmade arts and social mores" (Mendelssohn 1996, 53 
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Zöllner subdivided Bildung into Kultur and Aufklärung, Jerusalem subdivided Bildung into "government" [Regierung] and "education" [Erziehung] . Government concerns itself with the actions of members of society and seeks to direct them towards the common good by providing them with "reasons that motivate the will" [Bewegungsgründe] .
Education seeks to instill in individuals those convictions that motivate these actions, and attempts to do so by offering "reasons that persuade by their truth" [Wahrheitsgründe] ( Mendelssohn 1983, 40) . Despite the difference in terminology between Mendelssohn's article in the Berlinische Monatsschrift and his discussion in Jerusalem , the parallels are not difficult to see. "Enlightenment" and "education" are concerned with convictions, which they attempt to shape by examining the truth or falsehood of the beliefs which sustain these convictions. "Culture" and "government" are concerned with actions, which they seek to influence by providing incentives and disincentives that motivate the will.
At first glance, both Mendelssohn's understanding of enlightenment and his account of the relationship between church and state would appear to adhere to well-worn conventions in liberal thought. Like Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration, a work he knew and admired, Mendelssohn distinguishes "external" actions from "internal" convictions. He is concerned to confine the use of the coercive powers of the state to controlling the external actions of individuals. While legislation, with its system of rewards and punishments, can serve as an appropriate means for the motivation of the will, Mendelssohn -like Locke before him -thought it folly to assume that convictions could be coerced through laws establishing oaths of religious conformity.
Where Locke and Mendelssohn part company was over Locke's attempt to distinguish "the business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other." Locke had defined civil government as "a Society of
Men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of their own Civil
Interests" and defined "civil interests" as including "life, liberty, health, and indolency of 1983, 45) While the state had the power to order and to coerce, religion has only power of "love and beneficence." "The only rights possessed by the church," Mendelssohn (1983 59-60) insisted, "are to admonish, to instruct, to fortify, and to comfort; and the duties of the citizens toward the church are an attentive ear and a willing heart."
Second, Mendelssohn questioned the exclusively secular focus of Locke's understanding of "civil things." For Mendelssohn (1983, 42) , the best form of government was that state which "achieves its purposes by morals and convictions; in the degree, therefore, to which government is by education [Erziehung] itself." Hence, "one of the state's principal efforts must be to govern men through morals and convictions."
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Since laws cannot create convictions, and rewards and punishments cannot produce principles or refine morals, the only means the state has available for influencing the morals and the convictions of its citizens is "persuasion [Ueberzeugung] ."
It is here that religion should come to the aid of the state, and the church should become a pillar of civil felicity. It is the business of the church to convince people, in the most emphatic manner, of the truth of noble principles and convictions; to show them that duties toward men are also duties toward God, the violation of which is in itself the greatest misery … ; that serving the state is true service of Circumstances such as the growth of population or the development of cultural differences may force the state to rely increasingly on externally binding coercive laws, but Mendelssohn holds that these must be seen as secondary remedies, used by the state when it cannot achieve its ends in tandem with religion through the shaping of the convictions and morality of the population.
Mendelssohn explicitly rejected Locke's restriction of "civil interests" to the "temporal welfare" of the individual. It is, Mendelssohn (1983, 39) argued, neither in keeping with the truth nor advantageous to man's welfare to sever the temporal so neatly from the eternal. At bottom, man will never partake of eternity; his eternity is merely an incessant temporality. His temporality never ends; it is, therefore, an essential part of his permanency and inseparable from it. One
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confuses ideas if one opposes his temporal welfare to his eternal felicity.
Thus, the state cannot be completely indifferent to the matters that transcend the immediate concerns of "life, liberty, health, and indolency of body" and "the possession of outward things." The distinction between state and religion, Mendelssohn maintains, cannot be made at the level of the interests each seeks to advance. The state differs from religion in that it alone has the authority to shape actions through coercive laws. But it can enter into a partnership with religion in advancing, though education and persuasion, both the temporal and the eternal interests of individuals. the presence of the clergy at marriage ceremonies led the "unenlightened citizen" to feel that the marriage contract was unique in that it was made with God himself, while other contracts "are only made with men, and are therefore less meaningful." Because of this tendency to underestimate the importance of contracts which did not require clerical participation, Biester concluded that a purely civil wedding ceremony would be appropriate not only for the "enlightened citizen," who "can do without all of the ceremonies," but also for the unenlightened citizen, who would learn that all laws and contracts deserve respect (Hinske and Albrecht 1990, 95).
11
The article was signed with the initials "E. v. K.", a pseudonym that Beister had used on other occasions. See the editorial note in Hinske and Albrecht 1990, 484.
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Biester's intent, then, was not to remove religion from public life, but rather to teach citizens that all civil responsibilities, not just marriage, had a religious dimension.
"How excellent," he wrote, "if faith and civil duty were more integrated, if all laws had the sacredness of religious prescription" (Hinske and Albrecht 1990, 99 our striving and efforts, as a point on which we must set our eyes if we do not wish to lose our way." The more a people is brought, through art and industry, into harmony with this destiny, the more "Bildung " we ascribe to it. The goal is that culture and enlightenment join together to advance, and if it is ever forgotten, both will fall into corruption. 
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products of enlightenment theology. 13 Through a series meditations on the questions "Why do I exist?" and "What should I do?", the book sought to discover a fundamental rule that could serve to guide one's life. The first possibility Spalding considered was that of a life devoted to the satisfaction of physical drives, a possibility he quickly dismissed as offering no permanent satisfaction. Spalding next weighed the possibility of a life devoted to a more refined sort of desire, that associated with aesthetic experience.
Such a life, however, takes no consideration of my relationship to others, and it too is rejected. Spalding then turned to a life devoted to the pursuit of virtue, which proved to be the first serious possibility as a destiny for man. 14 Spalding, who translated the works Shaftesbury and Butler, shared their view that there is a natural disposition in mankind to work for the common good. For Spalding (1908, 25) our "natural" ability to judge matters of right and wrong is, in fact, the "voice of God, the voice of eternal truth, which speaks in me." This voice impels us to act to bring about a state of happiness that, because of the contingencies of human existence, can never be achieved on earth. This very failure to achieve the greatest good in this world holds out the promise of a future life wherein "my constrained and beclouded soul will be given so much more light and freedom that I will be assured of a complete enlightenment of all the obscure parts of the plan by which the world is ruled" (ibid., 28). This, then, is the ultimate end for which man is destined: immortality in the kingdom of God. 
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particular destinies and how this division set the stage for potential conflicts that might arise between the universal "destiny of man as man" and one particular destiny that individuals fulfill: the "destiny of man as citizen [Bürger] ." The problem does not arise for the practical dimension of Bildung. The goal of culture is the improvement of a social order that is divided into different estates and bound together by a network of rights and duties. Its task is to make sure that agreement between the various parts of the society is achieved. Its end can thus be nothing other than the cultivation of a Bürger, a member of political society, possessing certain rights and duties, equipped with the skills and abilities to perform a specific set of tasks. From the standpoint of culture, then, man's destiny is simply membership in civil society.
On the theoretical side of the process of Bildung, however, it is possible for there to be a conflict between the "destiny of man as man" and the "destiny of man as citizen."
Enlightenment has two differing aspects, an "enlightenment of the citizen
[Bürgeraufklärung]," which must adjust itself according to the ranks of society it addresses, and an "enlightenment of man [Menschenaufklärung] ," which is "universal"
and pays heed neither to social distinctions nor to the maintenance of social order.
"Certain truths," Mendelssohn (1996, 55) noted, "that are useful to men, as men, can at times be harmful to them as citizens." So long as this "collision" between the enlightenment of man and the enlightenment of citizen is confined to matters that do not directly address what Mendelssohn termed the "essential" destiny of man as man or man as citizen, and thus do not put into question either those aspects of men that distinguish them from animals or those dimensions of civic duties that are necessary for the preservation of public order, Mendelssohn (1996, 55) saw little cause for concern and argued that rules can easily be drawn up to resolve potential conflicts. It is an entirely different matter when a conflict arises between the "essential" destiny of man as citizen and either one's "essential" or "extra-essential" [außerwesentlichen] destiny as man.
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The "essential destiny of man," Mendelssohn explained in a letter to Hennings, "is a matter of existence [Daseyn] , the extra-essential destiny is a matter of improvement [Besserseyn] ." The first generates "perfection," the other "beauty." If it is not possible to achieve both, the latter must give way (Mendelssohn 1977, 236) . 15 "In the absence of the essential destiny of man," Mendelssohn (1996, 55) explained in the Berlinische Monatsschrift , "man sinks to the level of the beast; without the extra-essential destiny, he is no longer a good and splendid creature." The most severe conflict occurs in those "unhappy" times when the essential destinies of man as man and man as citizen collide.
In such cases the enlightenment that "is indispensable for man cannot be disseminated through all classes of the realm without the constitution being in danger of perishing."
Here philosophy lays its hand on its mouth! Here necessity may prescribe laws, or rather forge fetters, that are applied to mankind, to force them down, and hold them under the yoke! (Mendelssohn 1996, 55) When man's "essential" destiny as a citizen collides with his "extra-essential" destiny as man, the consequences are less grim. Here it is not a question of the state reducing man to the level of a beast, but rather of a situation where "certain useful and -for mankind -adorning truths may not be disseminated without destroying prevailing religious and moral tenets" (Mendelssohn 1996, 55) . Mendelssohn was echoing the views of a number of his colleagues in the Wednesday Society who saw a need to set limits to enlightenment; and he argued that in such cases the "virtue-loving bearer of 15 My rendering of Mendelssohn's "außerwesentlichen" as "unessential" in my translation of
Mendelssohn's essay (Mendelssohn 1996) now strikes me as potentially misleading. In the passages that follow, I have translated the term as "extra-essential."
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enlightenment will proceed with prudence and discretion and endure prejudice rather than drive away the truth that is so closely intertwined with it" (Mendelssohn 1996, 55). 
Jacobi on Faith and Political Power
Jacobi's critique of the Enlightenment reached its climax in his dispute with 
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an accusation of atheism. 17 According to Jacobi, during a conversation in the summer of 1780 Lessing had expressed admiration for Goethe's unpublished (and, to many contemporaries, sacrilegious) poem "Prometheus," and he had rejected "all orthodox conceptions of the divinity" in favor of the ancient Greek concept of the "One and All"
(hen kai pan). When a shocked Jacobi asked whether this did not amount to an allegiance to Spinozism, Lessing allegedly responded, "If I were to name myself after someone, I know of no other." For discussions, see Altmann, 1973, 613-21; Beiser 1987, 65-69; and Saine 1997, 214 , who notes the importance of the hypothetical form of Lessing's response, which does not mean "that he had to identify himself with any group or master."
19
For a discussion of Jacobi's general strategy in the Pantheism Dispute, see Altmann 1994, 6-8.
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and feeling. 20 Jacobi's initial literary efforts had been encouraged by Lessing, and after
Lessing's death in 1781 Jacobi sent copies of his novels to Mendelssohn, seeking support in the face of less-than-favorable reviews. Mendelssohn, repelled by what he saw as their excessive sentimentality, responded by suggesting that Jacobi aim for a greater "simplicity of style" -which was hardly what Jacobi wanted to hear. 21 The rebuff convinced Jacobi that Mendelssohn had been corrupted by the "magisterial, self-satisfied demeanor" that he saw as the hallmark of the "morgue berlinoise." (Mauthner 1912, 17; Altmann 1973, 604 ).
Jacobi's attack on the Berlin Enlightenment had begun several years earlier with a critique of its politics. Between 1759 and 1761, Jacobi studied in Geneva, a city that had become the emblem of republican virtue for many during the eighteenth century. He returned from his studies with a hatred of absolutism and a contempt for "the stupidity of people who in our century regard superstition as more dangerous than the growing power of unrestrained autocracy." 22 In 1782 he published a short work entitled Something Lessing Said, which began by recalling a conversation in which Lessing had said that all 20 For a discussion of the novels, see George di Giovanni's introduction to Jacobi 1994, 117-51. For discussions of Jacobi's relationship with the Sturm und Drang see Nicolai , 1971, 347-60; Heraeus 1928, 94-95; and Pascal 1953, 3, 151-52. 21 Mendelssohn's opinion was communicated to Jacobi by Christian Wilhelm Dohm in his letter of 
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of the arguments of princes against the rights of the papacy were "either groundless or applied with double and triple force to the princes themselves" (Jacobi 1996, 191) . 
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complicity with autocratic forms of rule, as long as the results of the policies of these rulers were seen as "enlightened."
The great mass of our thinkers … want to see the essentially true and the essentially good spread by power, and want to see every error suppressed by power. They would like to help promote an enlightenment -elsewhere than in the understanding, because that takes too long. They put out the lights, filled with childish impatience for it to be day. Oh hope-filled darkness, in which we hurriedly totter our way toward the goal of our wishes, toward the greatest good on earth; forward, on the path of violence and subjugation! (Jacobi 1996, 192) Seeking to achieve substantive ends that were presumed to serve the public's greater interest, the enlightened supporters of absolutism paid little heed, Jacobi argued, to the damage that was being done to the rule of law, the rights of individuals, and the civic life of the nation.
Jacobi insisted that civil society was, and could only be, "a mechanism of coercion" whose function should be simply "to secure for every member his inviolable property in his person, the free use of all his powers, and the full enjoyment of the fruits of their employment" (Jacobi 1996, 195) . Attempts by apologists for enlightened absolutism to justify more extensive state intervention in the life of its citizenswhether justified by appeals to the "interests of state" or the "welfare of the whole" -led only to "the advancement of self-interest, money-grubbing, indolence; of a stupid admiration of wealth, of rank, and of power; a blind unsavory submissiveness; and an anxiety and fear which allows no zeal, and tends towards the most servile obedience" (Jacobi 1996, 200) .
Drawing on Adam Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society,
Jacobi argued that present governments were in fact despotic forms of rule that corrupted
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civic virtue and individual morality by eradicating the freedom necessary if either is to flourish.
24
Mendelssohn criticized Jacobi's argument in his contribution to a multi-authored critical essay that was published anonymously in the Deutsches Museum of January 1783. The essay had been assembled, at Jacobi's request, from a number of critical letters Jacobi had received. His purpose in having these criticisms printed was to give him the pretext for writing a response that would amplify and clarify his original argument (see Altmann 1973, 599-600) . Against Jacobi, Mendelssohn maintained that "perfectly virtuous characters can be more easily formed under a despot" than in a republic and argued that the real questions, unanswered by Jacobi, were how one might go about transforming monarchies into popular regimes and whether such a step would be advisable. Urging restraint in criticizing the political establishment, Mendelssohn asked,
What is the point of all declamations which can lead to nothing, which should lead to nothing. We tell a sick person, with all the embellishments of rhetoric, that he is dangerously ill; but we do not tell him what he has to do to make himself healthy, or at least to lessen his suffering. It would be better for him to think he is healthy, than to hear a truth, which cannot be useful to him. (Jacobi 1815, 399-400) 25 24
Long quotations from the "noble Ferguson" may be found in Jacobi 1996, 198-200 . Jacobi also drew on two other defenders of republican virtue: Montesquieu (Jacobi 1996, 210 footnote 15) and
Machiavelli (Jacobi 1996 204-6) . For a discussion of Jacobi's use of Ferguson, see Oz-Salzberger 1995, 257-279. 25 As support for the argument that virtuous characters can be formed more easily under despotisms than republics, Mendelssohn appealed to Lessing's decision to set his Nathan in Turkey, and to Socrates, who "was raised in Athens at a time when the form of government was inclined towards tyranny"
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In his rejoinder, Jacobi (1815, 409) argued that such reticence could easily be overdone.
"I fully agree with the view: that one must not extinguish candles until it is day," he wrote in his response, "But it does no harm at least to undo the shutters" and thus avoid the fate of those "who out of fear of awakening too early have slept until a second sunset."
Jacobi's attack on the Berlin Enlightenment did not stop with the critique of its political views; he also questioned its understanding of the relationship between religion and reason. It was this issue that lay at the heart of the Pantheism Controversy. Jacobi's reading of David Hume and Thomas Reid had convinced him that reason cannot attain certainty about the existence of external objects, and that our experience of such objects takes the form of a revelation that is beyond argument and rests on "faith" alone.
26
Carrying this dichotomy between the spheres of faith and knowledge into theology, he argued that reason alone can never lead to certainty of God's existence. This, he claimed, was the lesson he took from Spinoza.
27
I love Spinoza because he, more than any other philosopher, has led me to the full realization that certain things cannot be (Jacobi 1815, 399) . The latter example is hardly compelling; with the exception of an oligarchy imposed by Sparta briefly at the close of the Peloponnesian war, Socrates' Athens was a democracy. 
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unraveled: one must not turn one's eyes from them; rather they must be taken as they are found. … I must assume a principle of thought and action that remains totally inexplicable to me. (Jacobi 1994, 193) For Jacobi, the goal of philosophy was not to explain the reasons for what existed. Its aim was rather simply "to disclose, to reveal existence."
Explanation is the means, the path to a goal, the next tasknever the last task. This last task is what can never be explained:
the irresolvable, the immediate, the simple. (Jacobi 1994, 194 ). These beds, these banks are the passions. Many have wanted to see it differently, and -against all appearances and arguments -
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have taken reason for the banks, and the passions for the stream.
(Jacobi 1996, 193) Jacobi was not disparaging reason. Indeed, he argued that only when "man is determined in and by himself" can he be said to be "fully human." "Where there is no freedom, no self-determination, there is no humanity" (Jacobi 1996, 193) . He was, however, insisting (like Hume before him) on the relative weakness of reason in the face of the passions.
Hence the difficulty facing political theory: civil society must be "an institution of reason and not of the passions, a means of freedom and not of slavery, constituted for beings who by nature stand in the middle between the two." Because reason can "never command a passion as such" civil society must find a way of turning the passions against each other, in order "to inhibit or stop one passion by means of another (Jacobi 1996, 194) . A creation of human reason, civil society was a mechanism for checking the passions by means of the passions. Its ultimate concern was not with making men good, but rather with protecting them from the actions of their fellow citizens.
That coercion without which the society cannot exist does not have as its object that which makes man good, but rather that which makes him evil; it has a negative rather than a positive purpose.
This purpose can be preserved and secured through external form;
and everything positive, virtue and happiness, then arise of themselves from their own source. (Jacobi 1996, 204) If we were looking for a brief summary of what liberalism meant in the eighteenth century, it would be difficult to improve on this passage.
Liberalism and the Limits of Reason
This brief sketch of the political views of Mendelssohn and Jacobi has led us to what may strike some as an unexpected result: Jacobi, the relentless critic of the Enlightenment,
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articulated a vision of civil society that was recognizably liberal, while Mendelssohn, the Enlightenment's faithful defender, elaborated a political philosophy that, in many respects, is difficult to square with liberal principles. Jacobi saw the function of legislation as fundamentally negative; its purpose was not to make men good, but rather to protect individual rights. Mendelssohn, in contrast, saw politics as performing an important role in the process of achieving our destiny. When the destinies of man and citizen come into conflict, the public good trump individual rights.
Perhaps this result should not be all that surprising. Blanket generalizations about See, in particular, O'Neill 1989, 3-27, especially 14-15, 17-20 and O'Neill 1990, 184-199, especially 190-4 .
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his argument through images drawn from law and politics. Critical philosophy, in this presentation, serves as "the true tribunal for all disputes of pure reason."
In When imported into philosophy, geometrical methods can produce only the "so many houses of cards" resting on foundations that must simply be accepted dogmatically (A727/B755). Reason, Kant insists, cannot derive its authority from such presuppositions.
It "depends on freedom for its very existence" and "its verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be permitted to express … his objections or even his veto" (A738-9/B766-7).
In his 1785 essay in the Berlinische Monatsschrift on the relationship between theory and practice, Kant sketched a conception of the nature of civil society that was as emphatic as Jacobi's in rejecting paternalistic conceptions of political rule. Kant insisted that a "paternal government," established on the principle of "benevolence" towards its people, represented "the greatest conceivable despotism." He called instead for a "patriotic government" in which each citizen is pledged to defend the individual's right to liberty (Kant 1991, 74) . We would seem to have returned to familiar ground: a defense of enlightenment and goes hand in hand with support for liberal principles of political
